Abstract-Attacks authored by state sponsored actors, criminal outfits, ideological enclaves and recreational hackers continue to trouble public and private cyber systems. In order to create and/or maintain an advantage over their adversaries, cyber defenders must pursue novel ways to detect, attribute and respond to offensive operations. Linkography is a topic that has been explored for decades that has found recent application to cyber security. Given the huge amounts of data available for cyber security applications of linkography, we favor semiautomated techniques to exploit this concept. In this paper, we propose a human supervised algorithm that will refine the abstractions used for this bulk approach to linkography. We found this algorithm resulted in automatically generated linkographs with higher accuracies than those derived from static abstractions. These findings suggest that linkography in general and abstraction refinement in particular are viable tools for cyber security practitioners.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber attacks from all kinds of actors continue to plague governments, companies and individuals. The fact that attributing these attacks is so difficult drives the numerator of the risk/reward ratio for cyber adversaries close to zero. Linkography can help crack this unsolved problem of attack attribution by giving information security practitioners a method to quantify the human behavioral element behind the attack. Gabriela Goldschmidt [4] wrote the seminal work on linkography applied to architecture and design. Fisher, et al. formally define linkography in [2] , but to summarize: Linkography is the practice of identifying and visualizing relationships among time series of creative and collaborative events and exploiting the resulting information. Information security practitioners can derive linkographs from audit data (such as console sessions and web server logs) and extract features (such as entropy and critical node count) from these linkographs. Features from historical linkographs can train machine learning models: Specifically, multinomial classifiers can support attack attribution. When cyber security Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. Approved for unlimited release: SAND2017-3304 C.
practitioners detect an attack, they can derive a linkograph and extract its features. These features can test these multinomial classifiers with input data to determine if the activity matches previously categorized behavior patterns. Linkographs can also support other lines of cyber defense: For example, binary classifiers can support intrusion detection, and multinomial classifiers can steer a dynamic defense by predicting an adversaries' next move.
Humans can create highly accurate linkographs. However, this is labor-intensive and data is abundant, so we recommend automating the process. This automatic linkograph generation procedure works as follows: First, we label the raw data set based on an abstraction. An abstraction is a set of classes, each of which is described by a number of regular expressions organized into stanzas. If a data point matches the regular expression contained in at least one of the stanzas of a class, it receives this label. Next, we apply an ontology to transform the labeled data set into a linkograph. An ontology is a directed graph whose vertices are the abstraction classes and whose edges are relationships that a linkographer assumes exist between a data point belonging to the source class followed by a data point belonging to the sink class. For clarity, we call a linkograph made in this way a derived linkograph. Contrast these derived linkographs with the created linkographs that humans make. Achieving this automation saves time, but the abstraction and ontology may be flawed due to human error and evolving attackers. Earlier, we proposed iteratively refining the ontology based on a human in the loop [6] . In this paper, we propose removing error caused by human mistakes and evolving attackers by iteratively refining the abstraction based on a human in the loop. Specifically, we assume that a human provides a few high quality linkographs, and we propose an algorithm that uses these created linkographs to polish a working abstraction.
Working through a simple example is helpful to understand applied linkography. Consider the original abstraction that Listing 1 shows. Notice this abstraction has three classes. The first two (Move and Execute) have one stanza each while the Look class comprises two stanzas. The only stanza of the Move class is a literal that will match any "copy" command. The only stanza of the Execute class is a regular expression that will match any command ending in ".exe." Each of the stanzas of the Look class are literals that will match any "type" or "ipconfig" command, respectively. Listing 2 shows an attacker caching files and configuration information in a directory named "upload." Consider the self loop ontology that Figure 1 shows. When we apply the abstraction shown
Move Look Execute in Listing 1 and the self loop ontology visualized in Figure 1 to the raw data set provided in Listing 2, the process yields the linkograph pictured in Figure 2 analyst looks at this raw data set and derived linkograph and notices that all of the data points are related. They propose the revised linkograph Figure 3 shows. This analyst believes all five events are related because of the "upload" artifact. Intuitively, the attacker is staging the defender's information for exfiltration in all of these commands. An abstraction refinement algorithm guided by Figure 3 could has three classes. However, the first class has three stanzas, while the Execute class still has one stanza and the third class still comprises two stanzas. The original stanza of the Move class is still present. However, one new stanza is a regular expression that will match any command beginning with "¿." The second new stanza is a literal that will match any "copy.exe" command. The Execute and Look classes remain unchanged. Figure 4 shows the derived linkograph that results from labeling the raw data set provided in Listing 2 with this new abstraction and applying the self loop ontology visualized in Figure 1 . However, a cyber security organization will not want to change to a completely new abstraction based on one human-created linkograph. This type of outfit will be more interested in gradually refining a working abstraction based on linkographs created by subject matter experts occasionally. This will allow the abstraction to benefit progressively from months and years of institutional learning. In order to balance the increased accuracy of a refined abstraction with the proven history of a legacy abstraction, we further constrain our abstraction refinement algorithm by limiting the number of changes it can make to the input abstraction. By accuracy, we mean the degree to which a linkograph derived using a particular abstraction and ontology resembles the linkograph created by a human from the same raw data set. Mitchell, et al. define accuracy formally in [6] , but to summarize: Accuracy is one minus the number of differences (underlinks and overlinks) between two linkographs over the number of possible links. Underlinks are the links that are present in the created linkograph but not in the derived linkograph. Conversely, overlinks are the links that are present in the derived linkograph but not in the created linkograph. Underlinks and overlinks are the two phenomena that reduce the accuracy of an abstraction. Accuracy is the supervisory metric by which abstraction refinement follows the lead of created linkographs and therefore the insight of the human analyst.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, Section II surveys other work related to this topic. Next, Section III proposes an abstraction refinement algorithm. Third, Section IV analyzes this algorithm's complexity. Next, Section V presents numerical data and figures that quantify and visualize the performance of our abstraction refinement algorithm. Finally, Section VI contains our conclusions from the study and identifies future lines of research.
II. LITERATURE SEARCH
Most historical and contemporary linkography research deals with design and architecture applications. However, Fisher, et al. [2] published the vanguard paper relating linkography to information security. Specifically, the authors provided formal definitions of linkography terms, proved foundational theorems pertaining to linkographs, described the automated linkograph derivation process and proposed linkograph metrics and analytical techniques. Their coup de grâce was exemplifying how linkographs can guide a dynamic defense based on honeycues.
Jarocki, et al. [5] published a technical report encompassing years worth of linkography research including a concept of operations, sessionization approaches, work related to abstractions and ontologies, machine learning models and protocol analyses. Sessionization refers to how an arbitrarily large raw data stream is partitioned into manageable pieces. Protocol analysis focuses on the human creation of linkographs.
Mitchell, et al. [6] investigated two ontology refinement algorithms: brute force minimum similarity and high impact first minimum similarity. This article includes a formal treatment of the concept of accuracy that we mentioned in Section I. As of this writing, there have not been any contributions to the linkography literature specific to cyber security since [6] . Contemporary work continues to focus on design and architecture.
[1] and [7] are two notable examples of recent work. Both of these studies use the Function-Behavior-Structure (FBS) framework [3] to analyze one design activity: specifically, six participants collaboratively designing the auditory aspects of a notional car. Despite its name, the FBS framework actually comprises five behavior classes: function (F), expected behavior (Be), structural behavior (Bs), structure (S) and documentation (D). Monache and Rocchesso [7] focus on the first five minutes of this design session which comprises return b 13: end function 81 nodes. The authors use LINKOgrapher [8] to help them conduct an in-depth analysis. They identify three different linkograph shapes: chunk, web and sawtooth. Erkut, et al. [1] provide a shallower look at the entire 46 minute design session which comprises 416 nodes. One takeaway from [1] and [7] is that they are highly human labor intensive. Another takeaway from these studies is that they presuppose direct access to the humans providing the data. Information security applications call for a different approach than do design and architecture applications: First, the timeline of our discipline does not allow for multiple subject matter experts to take days or weeks to ruminate over one data set. Also, cyber attackers will not consent to video or audio recording. Linkographic cyber security applications must create and analyze linkographs in near real time and do so using the available data (e.g., packets or keystrokes).
III. ALGORITHM
The top-level abstraction refinement algorithm, shown in Algorithm 1, requires four input parameters: b holds the current working abstraction, d holds the raw data set, l holds the human-created linkograph, and m holds the maximum number of changes allowed. This algorithm uses only one state component: b ′ retains the abstraction as it was prior to calling refine abstraction once(·). The basic idea is that Algorithm 1 repeatedly attempts to make one improvement to the abstraction. This algorithm exits after it makes the maximum number of changes allowed or it cannot find a change that will improve the abstraction.
The single abstraction refinement algorithm, shown in Algorithm 2, requires three input parameters: b holds the current working abstraction, d holds the raw data set, and l holds the human-created linkograph. This algorithm uses eight state components: u holds the accuracy of the current working abstraction. C holds the list of abstraction classes sorted by the frequency with which they appear in d. c iterates over the list of sorted abstraction classes. bma and bmc hold the accuracy and the associated class that find best merge(·) provides. Similarly, bsa, bsc0 and bsc1 hold the accuracy and the associated classes that find best split(·) provides.
Algorithm 2
for c ∈ C do 5: bma, bmc ← find best merge(C, c, b, d, l) 6: bsa, bsc0, bsc1 ← find best split(c, b, d, l) 7: if bma > bsa then 8: if bma > u then First, Algorithm 2 calculates the baseline accuracy of the input abstraction. Next, the algorithm sorts the abstraction classes by the frequency with which they appear in a labeling of the raw data set. Third, Algorithm 2 iterates over the abstraction classes. For each class, the algorithm calculates the best way to merge the class with one other class and the best way to split it into two classes. Finally, if either of these operations yields an improvement over the baseline accuracy, it selects the better of these two choices and returns. Instead of sorting the classes and exiting after discovering the first improvement over the baseline, the algorithm could test every abstraction class. While the worst case time complexity would remain the same, this would substantially increase the average case time complexity. The effectiveness of the high impact first minimum similarity algorithm from [6] inspired Algorithm 2's greedy approach using the list of sorted abstraction classes.
Algorithm 3 requires five input parameters: C holds the list of abstraction classes sorted by the frequency with which they appear in the raw data set, c is the abstraction class to be merged with another, b holds the current working abstraction, d holds the raw data set, and l holds the human-created linkograph. This algorithm uses five state components: bma and bmc hold the best accuracy measured so far and the associated class. c ′ iterates over the list of sorted abstraction classes. b ′ holds the provisional abstraction. u holds the accuracy of the provisional abstraction. First, Algorithm 3 calculates the baseline accuracy of the input abstraction. Next, the algorithm iterates over the sorted abstraction classes. It merges each abstraction class with the input abstraction class and calculates the accuracy of this provisional abstraction. Finally, the algorithm returns the most accurate merge option and its associated accuracy.
Algorithm 4 requires four input parameters: c is the Algorithm 3 Find the best class to merge with.
bmc ← None S ← stanzas(c) 6: for s ∈ S do return bsa, bsc0, bsc1 18: end function abstraction class to be split, b holds the current working abstraction, d holds the raw data set, and l holds the humancreated linkograph. This algorithm uses nine state components: bsa, bsc0 and bsc1 hold the best accuracy measured so far and the associated classes. S holds the stanzas that c comprises. s iterates over the stanzas of S. c 0 and c 1 hold the splits of c currently being considered. b ′ holds the provisional abstraction. u holds the accuracy of the provisional abstraction. First, the algorithm calculates the baseline accuracy of the input abstraction. Next, Algorithm 4 iterates over the stanzas that compose the abstraction class. It splits the abstraction class into two classes (one comprises just the stanza under consideration, and the other comprises all of the other stanzas) and calculates the accuracy of this provisional abstraction. Finally, the algorithm returns the most accurate split of c and its associated accuracy. We considered two other implementations but eliminated them from consideration in this work because of nonviable time complexity. The first explored all possible splits of c, but this has an exponential time complexity. Specifically, this requires testing 2 |S|−1 configurations. The second alternate implementation considered all near-equal splits. This means equal splits for classes with an even number of stanzas; for classes with an odd number of stanzas, this means one of the split classes has one more stanza than the other. This has factorial time complexity. Specifically, this requires testing n n/2 configurations.
split(·), merge(·) and calculate accuracy(·) are straightforward procedures with low time and space complexity.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze each of the four algorithms the previous section described in order to predict the resources each algorithm will require. We assume a generic single-processor, random-access model machine hosts these algorithms. We concentrate on finding the worst-case running time in order to provide the upper bound for each algorithm. Calculating the upper bounds guarantees that the algorithms will not take any longer.
In order to calculate the upper bound for Algorithm 1, we must assume that the if test on line 5 fails on every iteration. This allows the while loop to execute m times, and the algorithm calls refine abstraction once(·) on every iteration. This means that the complexity for this algorithm depends on the complexity of Algorithm 2. Therefore, Algorithm 1 is bounded by:
Calculating the upper bound for Algorithm 2 is more complicated than for Algorithm 1 because refine abstraction once(·) calls several other functions. However, since we know split(·), merge(·) and calculate accuracy(·) are straightforward procedures with low time complexity, we are able to determine that the upper bound for Algorithm 2 depends on the number of times the for loop on line 4 executes and the complexity of find best merge(·) and find best split(·). This means that Algorithm 2 depends on Algorithms 3 and 4 and is therefore bounded by:
Algorithm 3 finds the best class to merge a given class with. The complexity for find best merge(·) grows linearly and in direct proportion to the size of the input data, C. Thus this algorithm is bounded by |C|.
Lastly, Algorithm 4 finds the best way to split a given class. Like Algorithm 3, the complexity for this algorithm 
Therefore, the worst-case complexity for our proposed algorithm can vary according to the sorting algorithm used, runs in linear time with respect to m and |S| and runs in quadratic time with respect to |C|.
V. RESULTS

A. Warm Start: Five Class Abstraction
We have the advantage of ready access to information security experts, so we can take advantage of a working abstraction. We colloquially refer to this as a "warm start" because we are optimizing a considered, viable abstraction. This warm start abstraction comprises five classes: Move, Execute, Look, Transfer and Cleanup. We exercised our algorithm on a corpus of 47 logs of Windows console sessions authored by a real attacker exploiting a host belonging to a real enterprise. Two subject matter experts (coauthors of this paper) collaboratively created one linkograph for each of these sessions to supervise the abstraction refinement. We used a self loop ontology to derive all of the linkographs. Table I presents the accuracies and class counts resulting from applying abstraction refinement over this data set once, with various numbers of changes allowed.
We see substantial improvements in accuracy if just one change is allowed per iteration, and the point of diminishing returns appears after we allow three changes.
In terms of runtime complexity, Figure 5 shows that the algorithm grows sublinearly with respect to the maximum number of changes allowed. This is within the bound we predicted in Section IV.
B. Cold Start: Comprehensive Abstraction
Subject matter experts may not be readily available, so we explored how researchers can use abstraction refinement to bootstrap an abstraction based only on a raw data set. We colloquially refer to this as a "cold start" because we are starting from scratch with no prior insight. We began with a comprehensive abstraction comprising one class per unique entry in the raw data set. The 47 sessions in the raw data set comprise 1562 total commands; 158 of these commands are unique. We exercised our algorithm using this initial comprehensive abstraction as we described in Section V-A, using the same corpus and a self loop ontology. Table  II presents the accuracies and class counts resulting from applying abstraction refinement over this data set once, with various numbers of changes allowed.
While the accuracy only improves marginally, the number of abstraction classes decreases sharply. This is a useful result, because we want to limit the number of abstraction classes to something on the order of 10. This will prevent the human analyzing a linkograph from being overwhelmed. Cold start abstraction refinement actually provides a way to aid analysts in an automated fashion by organizing the data (classes) in a more digestible fashion. In terms of runtime complexity, Figure 6 shows that the algorithm grows sublinearly with respect to the maximum number of changes allowed. This is within the bound we predicted in Section IV.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In future work, we will study a number of open questions from this article. First, we will limit the maximum number of abstraction classes in the same fashion that we currently limit the maximum number of changes. Also, instead of splitting classes by stanzas, we will act on the aggregate regular expression represented by the stanzas. Third, we will combine abstraction and ontology refinement. Also, the accuracies the proposed abstraction refinement algorithm yields for the cold start scenario fall well short of those for the warm start. This indicates the algorithm is susceptible to channeling into local optimums. A future research goal is to find a polynomial time abstraction refinement technique which can drive cold start accuracies to match those of any warm start scenario, given enough changes allowed. But even the warm start experiment did not reach the 90th percentile of accuracy, so there could be other methods (supervised, higher complexity algorithms not yet tried, etc.) that might improve this accuracy. Also, we might need a metric or at least a heuristic for "accurate enough" here. Fifth, we will consider models of behavior. The methods we described in this article can be used to quantitatively compare models of different attackers (attack attribution) or the same attacker over time (evolving attacker). Once we model cyber attack behavior, we can model the defensive side in the same fashion. Given both of these models, we can use game theoretic methods to play out various scenarios. We will derive defensive strategies and measure their effectiveness given a specific attacker model and provide feedback in real time to the defender when a strategy loses its edge. Finally, while the abstraction refinement process we propose applies to linkography, our human guided refinement of roughly characterized initial data may inspire machine learning researchers who face a shortage of reliable labeled data.
